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POST-DEATH CASH RENT LEASING:
ONE MORE TIME
— by Neil E. Harl*
The law on cash rent leasing of farmland subject to
special use valuation has been clear for nearly a decade.1
Other than for the two-year grace period immediately
following death2 and the 1988 amendment allowing cash
rent leases by a surviving spouse to a member of the
surviving spouse’s family,3 cash rent leasing by a qualified
heir in the post-death period causes recapture of special use
valuation benefits.4
Gavin v. United States
Notwithstanding the crystal clear rule, the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals decided a case on May 8, 1997, allowing
cash rent leasing in a period after death that extended
beyond the two-year grace period.5  In that case, Gavin v.
United States,6 the decedent entered into a cash rent lease
with his farming son, Gary, on January 4, 1990, to be
effective for the crop year beginning March 1, 1990.  The
decedent died on January 17, 1990, leaving the land to his
children and grandchildren. The farming son, the tenant,
inherited a one-seventh interest in the land.  The will also
granted Gary the option to purchase the land from the estate
and specified that if the option was exercised, the son would
have one year to obtain financing for the purchase. A notice
of intent to exercise the option was signed on December 12,
1990, for one tract with the purchase completed on October
1, 1991, less than two years after the decedent’s death.  For
this parcel, the two-year grace period covered the period of
cash rental with the major consequence that the recapture
period was extended beyond 10 years by the period of cash
renting.7
On February 4, 1992, more than two years after the
decedent’s death, the son signed a notice of intent to
exercise the option to purchase the other tract.  Gary, the
farming son, continued to pay cash rent to the decedent’s
estate until February 29, 1992.  On March 2, 1992, Gary
made a down payment on that parcel.
The Eighth Circuit, quoting Minter v. United States8
(which has been roundly criticized) 9 for the dubious
proposition that a qualified heir who receives cash rental
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income “does not automatically lose the benefits of special
use valuation,”10 proceeded to state that the qualified heirs
in Gavin v. United States11 did not enter into a cash rent
lease with just “another farmer.”12 Rather, the court opined,
the rental was to the qualified heir whom the decedent “had
groomed for many years to take over the family farm.”13
The court hedged its position slightly by saying, “although
not dispositive, we conclude that the identity of the farmer
is relevant to determining whether a decedent’s heirs were
mere landlords collecting a fixed rent.”14  The court, in a
display of lack of understanding of the statute and the
litigated cases, in support of that position cites a passage in
LeFever v. Commissioner,15 stating that “cash rental of the
property to a nonfamily member is not a qualifying use.”16
That statement in LeFever was made in the context of the
pre-death qualification requirements.17  The statement in
LeFever scarcely proves that cash rent leasing to a related
tenant is permissible in the post-death period.
It has been clear since 1981 that cash rental of land in
the pre-death period to a member of the decedent’s family is
permissible.18  It has been equally clear that cash rental of
land even to a member of the qualified heir’s family in the
post-death period causes recapture of special use valuation
benefits19 except for the two year grace period immediately
following death20 and, since 1988, cash rental by a surviving
spouse to a member of the surviving spouse’s family.21
Similarly, the Gavin court cited the case of Brockman  v.
Commissioner22 for the proposition that “the case law and
the legislative history of Section 2032A both made clear
that the qualified use requirement is not satisfied if a
decedent’s financial stake or other involvement in land is
merely that of a landlord who collects a fixed rent from an
unrelated tenant.”23  That is a defensible statement for any
court to make but it provides no support for approving cash
rental to a related tenant in the post-death period.  In citing
to the 1976 Committee report on special use valuation,24 the
court mistakenly refers to a discussion of the pre-death
qualification requirements25 rather than the post-death
qualified use test.26  The Eighth Circuit made essentially the
same error in Minter v. United States.27  It is becoming clear
that the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals does not
understand the differences between the pre-death and the
post-death tests.  The Court does cite, correctly, to
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Williamson v. Commissioner28 for the proposition that cash
rental to a relative will not suffice in the post-death period.29
Indeed, that is the holding of every court that has considered
the issue other than for Gavin v. United States.30  The
approval by the Eighth Circuit in Minter v. United States31
of a cash rent lease to a family corporation where two of the
qualified heirs were far from being fully at risk now appears
to have been an appropriate prelude to the glaring misstep
in Gavin.
The court in Gavin tried, feebly, to redeem itself with
the assertion that the qualified heirs were “at risk” because
the cash rent might not be paid.32  In light of the fact that
Iowa, the state of the decedent’s domicile and the location
of the farmland in question, has the most complete and far-
reaching landlord’s lien in the United States33 makes that
assertion less than compelling.
The court makes much of the fact that the lease with the
son for the parcel of land in question provided for an option
of $10,000 fixed cash rent or a 50 percent share of the
crops.34  In point of fact, however, the tenant paid cash rent
for the land.  It is scarcely relevant what the tenant might
have paid in rental.
In conclusion
The decision in Gavin35 confirms the age-old adage that
“tough cases make bad law.”  It is clear from the record that
the tenant was a bona fide farmer and came within 45 days
of fully complying with the statute to avoid recapture of
special use valuation benefits.  However, it does not build
confidence in the tax system or the judicial system to torture
both the law and the facts to reach a desired result.
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
EXEMPTIONS
TOOLS OF THE TRADE. The debtors were cattle
breeders and raisers and owned two bulls used in the
operation. One bull was subject to a security interest and the
debtors sought to avoid the lien as impairing the exemption
for the bull as a tool of the trade. The court acknowledged
case precedent on both sides of the issue and held that an
animal could not be eligible for the tool of the trade
exemption because the exemption statute, Section
522(F)(1)(B)(i), provided for an exemption for animals used
for personal, family or household use. The debtors also
sought to avoid a lien on hay and grain which was to be
used to feed the cattle. The court held that the exemption for
feed was limited to the amount necessary for animals for the
personal, family or household use and was not available for
business assets. In re Smith, 206 B.R. 186 (Bankr. N.D.
Iowa 1996).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
DISCHARGE. The debtor first filed a Chapter 13 case
in 1988 which was eventually dismissed in 1991. Three
